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I 
INTRODUCTION 
The year 2015 saw conflicting messages about the value and desirability of 
carbon markets. On one hand, carbon markets advanced in and among several 
countries. The European Union’s Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) 
continued to operate, now in its third phase. China announced plans to launch a 
nationwide carbon market to limit greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, building on 
its seven pilot trading programs. The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) incorporated market-based compliance options in the final version of its 
Clean Power Plan—a rule promulgated pursuant to the Clean Air Act to limit 
carbon dioxide emissions from existing power plants.1 The newly elected 
government in Canada ran on a platform of a national program to integrate the 
different carbon pricing schemes emerging at the provincial level.2 South Korea 
launched its own cap-and-trade program to limit GHGs. Proponents of carbon 
markets ended the year on a high note with the conclusion of the Paris 
Agreement in December, resulting in a new international regime to reduce global 
GHG emissions that includes a key provision implicitly allowing the use of 
market mechanisms as an option for doing so.3 
On the other hand, critics of carbon markets also raised concerns in 2015. 
Pope Francis offered a high-profile contrary view in Laudato Si, the papal 
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1.  Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility
Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,661, 64,675 (Oct. 23, 2015) (codified as amended 40 C.F.R. § 60) 
[hereinafter Clean Power Plan].  
2.  Shawn McCarthy, Trudeau announces carbon-pricing plan if Liberals win election, GLOBE & 
MAIL (Feb. 6, 2015), http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/trudeau-vows-to-adopt-carbon-
pricing-if-liberals-win-election/article22842010/ [https://perma.cc/V4XF-YBM8]. 
3. Paris Agreement, art. 6, opened for signature Apr. 22, 2016, U.N. FCCC/CP/2015/L.9/Rev.1
(authorizing the use of “voluntary . . . internationally transferr[able] mitigation outcomes”). 
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encyclical released in July 2015. In a broad critique, the pope questioned whether 
market capitalism can effectively protect the poor, and in one passage specifically 
criticized “the strategy of buying and selling ‘carbon credits.’”4 As discussed in 
detail in part III of this article, there are conflicting views regarding the meaning 
of this passage,5 but it is clear that the pope’s language brought renewed attention 
to moral and ethical concerns regarding emissions markets. 
Beyond markets or other policy mechanisms, the general debate about 
climate policy is often framed in moral and ethical terms.6 Some proponents of 
GHG mitigation efforts emphasize a right to a stable climate system, a duty to 
protect the rights of future generations, nature, or divine creation, and the 
prospect that climate change will disproportionately afflict the world’s poor —
who had less to do with causing the global commons problem and who are more 
vulnerable to its impacts in rising sea levels, increased storm activity, floods, and 
drought.7 Economic analyses of climate change policy may not appear to be 
presented in moral terms, but they typically rest on the premise that climate 
policy is warranted when it advances the moral/ethical objective of maximizing 
social net benefits or aggregate well-being. At the same time, various critics of 
climate policy (that is, opponents of climate policy in general, whether using 
markets or other policy mechanisms) also raise moral claims, such as the concern 
that climate policy would impinge on individuals’ freedom from government 
control, would burden poorer countries’ rights to develop free of eco- 
 
 
 
 4.  POPE FRANCIS, LAUDATO SI’: ON CARE FOR OUR COMMON HOME ¶ 171 (2015) (“The 
strategy of buying and selling ‘carbon credits’ can lead to a new form of speculation which would not help 
reduce the emission of polluting gases worldwide. This system seems to provide a quick and easy solution 
under the guise of a certain commitment to the environment, but in no way does it allow for the radical 
change which present circumstances require. Rather, it may simply become a ploy which permits 
maintaining the excessive consumption of some countries and sectors.”). Other critics of carbon markets 
as a mechanism to combat climate change also argue that using such markets will disadvantage the poor, 
see, e.g., FRIENDS OF THE EARTH, CLIMATE JUSTICE BRIEFS NO. 8: THE DANGER OF CARBON 
MARKETS (2010) (“In theory, carbon markets do not reduce emissions in developed countries but merely 
shift the burden of doing so to developing countries.”). 
 5.  See infra part III.  
 6.  Framing pollution as immoral has a long history. See Arden Rowell, Allocating Pollution, 79 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 985, 990–95 (2012). In addition to the papal encyclical, recent examples of framing climate 
change in moral terms include C. ROSER-RENOUF ET AL., FAITH, MORALITY AND THE ENVIRONMENT: 
PORTRAITS OF GLOBAL WARMING’S SIX AMERICAS (Yale Program on Climate Change Comm’n ed., 
2016), and James Garvey, Climate Change and Moral Outrage, HUM. ECOLOGY REV., Winter 2010, at 
96, 96–101 (2010). 
 7.  See, e.g., Juliana v. United States, No. 6:15-cv-01517-TC, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 156014, at *51 
(D. Or. Nov. 10, 2016) (upholding plaintiffs’ argument that “the right to a climate system capable of 
sustaining human life is fundamental to a free and ordered society”); Glenn Althor et al., Global 
Mismatch Between Greenhouse Gas Emissions and the Burden of Climate Change, 6 SCI. REP. 20281 (Feb. 
5, 2016) (concluding that higher emitting countries are less likely to be vulnerable to negative impacts of 
future climate change); INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 
2014: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION, AND VULNERABILITY: TECHNICAL SUMMARY 7 (2014) (“People who 
are socially, economically, culturally, politically, institutionally, or otherwise marginalized in society are 
often highly vulnerable to climate change and climate change responses.”).  
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imperialism, or exhibits hubris because humans cannot be powerful enough to 
alter divine creation.8 
This article focuses on the morality of markets as a mechanism to mitigate 
climate change rather than on the morality of climate change itself or climate 
policy in general. Over the past half century, some environmental advocates 
favored using market mechanisms, while other environmental advocates opposed 
market-based policy design on both moral grounds.9 Market-based policies, such 
as those aimed at reducing lead in gasoline and acid rain, were adopted in the 
1980s and 1990s as a means to achieve environmental goals at lower cost than 
traditional, inflexible regulatory instruments.10 As these market-based policies 
began to overcome political hurdles to their adoption, many environmental 
advocates (especially the large national environmental groups) came to view 
well-designed market-based policies more favorably. A new flank of critics arose 
opposing the growth of market-based environmental policies due to their 
opposition to the underlying environmental goals, rather than to markets as a 
policy mechanism.11 Now, opposition to market-based policy design has been 
renewed by some advocates of strong climate policy, including Pope Francis and 
some environmental and social justice groups.12 
This article explores the contrast between the movement toward 
environmental markets, characterized by the emergence of new carbon markets 
across the globe, versus the renewed opposition to markets manifested in the 
 
 8.  See, e.g., Michael Snow, Global Warming Myth Buried Under Snowstorm of Hubris, DAKOTA 
VOICE, Feb. 26, 2010, http://www.dakotavoice.com/2010/02/global-warming-myth-buried-under-
snowstorm-of-hubris/ [https://perma.cc/VU7L-BZWM]. 
 9.  See, e.g., Robert E. Goodin, Selling Environmental Indulgences, 47 KYKLOS 573 (1994) 
(analogizing “green taxes [to] medieval indulgences”).  
 10.  See A. DENNY ELLERMAN, PAUL L. JOSKOW, RICHARD SCHMALENSEE, JUAN-PABLO 
MONTERO & ELIZABETH M. BAILEY, MARKETS FOR CLEAN AIR: THE U.S. ACID RAIN PROGRAM 
(2005). 
 11.  See, e.g., Michael A. Livermore & Richard L. Revesz, Interest Groups and Environmental Policy: 
Inconsistent Positions and Missed Opportunities, 45 ENVTL. L. REV. 1 (2015) (arguing that the political 
left initially opposed market-based environmental policy but has come to favor it, while the political right 
initially favored it but has come to oppose it); see also Jonathan B. Wiener & Barak D. Richman, 
Mechanism Choice, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON PUBLIC CHOICE AND PUBLIC LAW (Daniel A. Farber 
& Anne Joseph O’Connell eds., 2010) (detailing the political economy of policy instrument choice). 
Moreover, those on the political right who express doubt about the science of climate change policy may 
do so because they fear the costs of the solution, so offering a more cost-effective policy solution, such as 
tax or cap-and-trade, may help enlist their support. Troy H. Campbell & Aaron C. Kay, Solution 
Aversion: On the Relation between Ideology and Motivated Disbelief, J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL., 
Nov. 2014, at 809. This is particularly likely if the alternative is more costly regulation, though perhaps 
not if the alternative is no regulation. 
 12.  Arguments that frame mitigating climate change as a moral imperative are not necessarily 
arguments against using market-based incentive policy designs to do so. Some advocates of ambitious 
climate change mitigation are also advocates of using market-based incentive policies to achieve this goal. 
Some other advocates of ambitious climate change mitigation are critics of market-based policies, and 
that is the viewpoint to which this article responds. Meanwhile, some critics of market-based climate 
policies are really critics of any climate change mitigation action, in other words, those whose opposition 
to cap-and-trade is driven by antipathy to the cap (on emissions and, they fear, on economic growth or 
freedom) and not by antipathy to the use of trading markets (which they tend to favor in other domains).  
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pope’s encyclical and the views of some environmental advocates. It considers 
the arguments raised by these latter critics, explores alternative views of their 
concerns, and examines how market-based climate policies could be designed to 
alleviate these concerns. Others have examined the moral and ethical dimensions 
of market-based climate policies,13 but this article contributes to the literature by 
providing a contemporary examination of the papal encyclical’s prominent 
questioning of the use of markets to address climate change. It also speaks to 
issues that more than 190 countries now face under the Paris Agreement14 and 
that forty-eight U.S. states face under the Clean Power Plan15 as they decide what 
role, if any, market-based instruments will play in their pursuit of the greenhouse 
gas reductions. And it explores options for designing a market-based instrument 
to address climate change in ways that could ease some of the moral criticisms, 
and discusses some of the tradeoffs involved in those design choices. 
Part II reviews how market-based mechanisms are being designed for climate 
change policy. Part III examines the pope’s encyclical and the moral issues it 
raises regarding carbon markets. Part IV assesses in more detail the moral 
objections to using market-based mechanisms for climate change policy and 
offers counterpoints to these arguments. Part V discusses possible ways to 
reconcile these viewpoints by designing market-based climate policies in ways 
that resolve or reduce the critics’ concerns and discusses the tradeoffs associated 
with each approach. Part VI concludes by offering specific insights into the 
decisions faced and tradeoffs presented by market-based climate policies. 
II 
MARKET-BASED MECHANISMS AND CLIMATE POLICY 
The following subparts provide an overview of the economic theory 
underlying emissions markets, as well as some equity considerations that arise 
when evaluating whether and how to implement an emissions market. 
A. Pricing Via a Pollution Tax 
The idea of putting a price on pollution as an economically efficient way to 
reduce its incidence has been around for almost 100 years. Arthur Pigou’s The 
Economics of Welfare formally established the idea that pollution and other 
negative externalities are excessive because those who produce the polluting 
goods do not pay the full cost of production; namely, they avoid paying for the 
 
 13. See, e.g., Simon Caney & Cameron Hepburn, Carbon Trading: Unethical, Unjust and Ineffective?, 
69 ROYAL INST. PHIL. SUPP. 201 (2011); Michael K. Goodman & Emily Boyd, A Social Life for Carbon? 
Commodification, Markets and Care, 177 GEOGRAPHICAL J. 102 (2011). 
 14.  Paris Agreement, supra note 3. 
 15.  Clean Power Plan, supra note 1. As this article goes to press, the fate of the Clean Power Plan is 
uncertain. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit is considering multiple challenges to the Clean 
Power Plan. E.g., West Virginia v. EPA, No. 15-1363 (D.C. Cir. filed Mar. 28, 2016), and President Trump 
indicated during his campaign that he would “scrap” the rule. See Robert Walton, Trump Vows to Scrap 
the Clean Power Plan, UTILITY DIVE (Sept. 23, 2016), http://www.utilitydive.com/news/trump-vows-to-
scrap-clean-power-plan/426905/ [https://perma.cc/RY7L-WMN4].  
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harm to other parties who bear the consequences of the environmental damage 
they cause.16 The standard correction is to assess a fee (often referred to as a 
Pigouvian tax) equal to the value of the harm caused for each unit of pollution 
produced. Requiring emitters to internalize the cost of environmental harm 
changes their economic calculation regarding production and consumption of 
energy, agriculture, or other goods and services. Higher emitting options that 
were deemed attractive in the absence of an emissions price may become 
economically unattractive once the cost of those emissions is incorporated into 
the production process. 
Incorporating externalities into the cost of production has the virtue of 
“getting the price right” and moves the market toward the economically efficient 
outcome, from a utilitarian social welfare maximization perspective, in which the 
price paid for a good reflects the full marginal cost of its production. If the price 
paid also equals the marginal benefit to the consumer, the result is an efficient 
product market outcome wherein the marginal benefit of the last unit consumed 
equals the marginal cost of its production, inclusive of the value of the harm it 
imposes on parties external to the private goods transaction. In the context of 
climate change, the harm is the damage imposed on society from the GHG 
emissions generated by the production process—commonly referred to as the 
“social cost of carbon” (SCC).17 
The efficiency of such a Pigouvian GHG policy—commonly called a “carbon 
tax”—in the product market is coupled with its cost-effectiveness in GHG 
abatement across firms. For firms facing a tax on GHG emissions, the optimal 
response will be to reduce emissions by incurring costs up to the size of the tax. 
If all polluters do this, it ensures two things. First, if the tax is set at the SCC, then 
the marginal cost of abatement equals the marginal value of abatement (avoided 
SCC), which is the socially efficient level of abatement. Second, regardless of 
whether the tax is set at the SCC, emitters subject to the tax will equate their 
marginal costs of abatement to the common tax they face, thereby minimizing 
cumulative abatement costs across the covered sources. Equal marginal cost 
across all sources allows emission reductions to occur where they are most cost-
effective because the total cost of abatement cannot be lowered by shifting 
reductions from one source to another. 
B. Emission Allowance Trading As An Alternative To a Carbon Tax 
The regulator concerned about climate change can address the problem with 
a price-based instrument such as a carbon tax, as described above, or by setting a 
quantitative limit on emissions and issuing permits (also called “allowances”) that 
parties may trade subject to the emissions limit, a system that is commonly called 
“cap-and-trade.” The trading market will then yield a price for each allowance. 
The choice between a tax and an allowance trading system is referred to as the 
 
 16.  ARTHUR C. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE (1920) (Palgrave Macmillan, 4th ed. 2013).  
 17.  William Pizer et al., Using and Improving the Social Cost of Carbon, SCIENCE, Dec. 5, 2014, at 
1189. 
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price-versus-quantity choice in economic instruments for GHG abatement and 
other forms of pollution control.18 Currently, cap-and-trade programs are more 
commonly used than taxes to regulate GHGs, though carbon taxes have emerged 
in some settings and are under consideration in several others.19 
Cap-and-trade systems share common theoretical elements with pollution 
taxes. Under a cap-and-trade system, as with a tax, polluters will reduce emissions 
up to the point where the marginal cost of abatement equals the price paid to 
pollute. Under cap-and-trade, however, the price paid equals the market price 
for an emissions allowance, formed by the supply and demand of available 
allowances in the so-called “carbon market.” A fundamental difference between 
the two is that a pollution tax fixes the price to emit (while letting the quantity of 
emissions adjust in response to the tax), whereas a cap-and-trade allowance price 
varies due to shifts in allowance supply and demand (while the quantity of 
emissions is fixed). In both cases, the expectation is that the marginal cost of 
GHG abatement is equated across sources at any one time—resulting in a cost-
effective outcome. 
Under cap-and-trade, the price that emerges is effectively determined by the 
marginal cost of meeting the fixed emissions cap. Although regulators may 
attempt to set this emissions quantity cap at the socially optimal level, at the point 
where the marginal benefits (avoided SCC) of further reductions equal their 
marginal cost of abatement, there is uncertainty about what the socially optimal 
emissions level is, given the uncertainty in marginal costs and marginal benefits.20 
The price that emerges from a carbon market, therefore, may not be equal to the 
SCC, and thus the abatement outcome, though cost-effective, may not be purely 
efficient. Meanwhile, such uncertainty about actual marginal costs and benefits 
may lead a carbon tax to differ from the optimal quantity of emissions, whereas 
cap-and-trade assures a cap on the quantity of emissions, an attribute that 
environmental advocates have often favored. Of course, the carbon tax may also 
be set at a different level than the SCC due to either the same sources of 
uncertainty or political reasons.21 
 
 18.  Martin L. Weitzman, Prices vs. Quantities, 41 REV. ECON. STUD. 477, 477 (1974). See also 
Lawrence H. Goulder & Andrew R. Schein, Carbon Taxes Versus Cap-and-Trade: A Critical Review, 
CLIMATE CHANGE ECON., Nov. 18, 2013, at 1350010-1 (“examin[ing] the relative attractions of a carbon 
tax, a ‘pure’ cap-and-trade system, and a ‘hybrid’ option”); Jonathan B. Wiener, Property and Prices to 
Protect the Planet, 19 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 515–34 (2009) (comparing tax versus allowance trading 
systems for global GHG abatement). 
 19.  ALEXANDRE KOSSOY ET AL., STATE & TRENDS OF CARBON PRICING 2015 22 (World Bank 
Group ed., 2015). See also Brian Murray & Nicholas Rivers, British Columbia’s Revenue-Neutral Carbon 
Tax: A Review of the Latest “Grand Experiment” in Environmental Policy, 86 ENERGY POL’Y 674, 675 
(2015) (“While [emissions trading systems] predominate[] in climate policy, several jurisdictions either 
have or are considering a tax alone or in some combination with an [emissions trading system]”).  
 20.  See Weitzman, supra note 18 (discussing “uncertainty” in his model and its importance in policy 
discussions). 
 21.  See Wiener, Property and Prices to Protect the Planet, supra note 18, (discussing institutional and 
political economy attributes at the international level that may inform the choice between cap-and-trade 
versus carbon taxes). 
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A well-designed tax or cap-and-trade policy, therefore, can achieve emission 
reduction goals for the targeted pollutant(s) at the least cost. Both policy 
approaches provide incentives for firms to invest in innovation to reduce 
emissions at even lower cost, thereby either avoiding more of the tax, or freeing 
up additional allowances for sale. Other policy instruments are less likely to be 
as efficient. For example, prescriptive technology standards prevent flexibility in 
the choice of methods of abatement, and prevent locational flexibility in the face 
of variations in the cost of abatement across firms. Performance standards allow 
flexibility in the choice of methods of abatement, but not flexibility across firms. 
Information disclosure policies may be low-cost, but may also yield an uncertain 
amount of abatement. 
C. Markets, Flexibility, Global And Localized Effects 
The overarching appeal of emissions markets is that they can reduce pollution 
at the lowest overall cost to society—a strategy that is particularly well suited to 
a class of pollutants such as GHGs that cause global, rather than local, impacts. 
One ton of GHG emitted in one location has the same climate impact as one ton 
emitted in another location, so the flexibility allowed by trading an emission 
allowance from one place to another should have a neutral effect on the climate 
so long as the emissions are verified in both places. Trading allows for the same 
net GHG emission-reduction benefit at a lower cost. 
However, even though GHGs emitted anywhere have similar global effects, 
the sources of these GHG emissions may also emit other pollutants that have 
local and regional impacts (such as sulphur dioxide, nitrous oxides, and mercury 
from coal-fired power plants). Allowing GHG emitters the cost-saving flexibility 
to respond to a market price on GHGs may not address these local pollution 
effects. Some of the moral criticisms of GHG markets discussed below relate to 
such local impacts, especially where the co-pollutants affect poor or 
disadvantaged communities. Policymakers may want to tailor the structure of 
emissions markets to address these local co-pollutant effects, even if doing so 
lowers the cost-effectiveness of the GHG reduction pathway. There may also be 
local economic dislocations from closing emitting facilities. An optimal approach 
to address all of the impacts may involve complementary global and local 
policies. 
III 
THE POPE’S ENCYCLICAL AND THE MORALITY OF CARBON MARKETS 
In May 2015, Pope Francis released Laudato Si, a papal encyclical discussing 
the themes of environmental protection, inequality, and the failures of the 
modern economy to provide for the wellbeing of all. This encyclical is important 
not only because it is a powerful statement from the leader of one of the world’s 
largest religious denominations, but also because the pope offers a wide-ranging, 
forceful, and detailed series of arguments outlining why, and in some cases, how, 
the “whole human family” should address climate change and other pressing 
MONAST MURRAY WIENER FORMATTED_PREPROOF_PERMA (DO NOT DELETE) 3/14/2017  2:31 PM 
142 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 80: 135 
environmental challenges.22 Pope Francis emphasizes the importance of 
individual responsibility and rejects overreliance on technology and markets as 
solutions to the world’s ills. 
The encyclical gives voice to longstanding concerns regarding emissions 
trading markets and reflects many of the major criticisms of these mechanisms.23 
First, much of the encyclical critiques free market ideologies as fundamentally 
flawed frameworks for distributing resources in an ethical manner, at least as 
currently practiced.24 The pope specifically criticizes the pursuit of profit 
maximization, which he argues can harm future generations and the 
environment.25 Numerous provisions also reject technocratic decisionmaking and 
overreliance on technological advancements in place of taking personal 
responsibility for one’s actions.26 
Second, the encyclical is rooted in a concern that the modern market-based 
economy leads to unjust results, primarily for the world’s poor.27 The pope 
dedicates two sections of the encyclical to global inequity and the inadequate 
governmental response.28 
Third, the pope specifically criticizes “[t]he strategy of buying and selling 
‘carbon credits’” out of concern that the strategy “can lead to a new form of 
speculation which would not help reduce the emission of polluting gases 
worldwide.”29 He says that such a carbon credit market “seems to provide a quick 
and easy solution under the guise of a certain commitment to the environment, 
but in no way does it allow for the radical change which present circumstances 
require. Rather, it may simply become a ploy which permits maintaining the 
excessive consumption of some countries and sectors.”30 
Commentators disagree on whether this “surprisingly specific and 
unambiguous language”31 is a general rebuke of emissions trading as a policy 
instrument, or an attempt to call attention to specific potential problems with the 
 
 22.  POPE FRANCIS, supra note 4, at ¶ 13.  
23.   Laudato Si’ is part of a long tradition of papal encyclicals and Catholic social teachings that 
explore the workings of the market and neoliberal economic orthodoxy more generally. See, e.g., PAPAL 
DOCUMENTS, VATICAN, http://www.vatican.va/offices/papal_docs_list.html [https://perma.cc/2FV6-
68B3] (last accessed Feb. 1, 2017); Stephen Beale, 7 Papal Encyclicals that Changed the World, CATHOLIC 
EXCHANGE (June 24, 2013), http://catholicexchange.com/7-papal-encyclicals-that-changed-the-world 
[https://perma.cc/4SAR-9MUW]; Bruce Duncan, Tackling Capitalism: What Vatican II Achieved and 
What Still Needs to Be Done, 26 PACIFICA 199 (2013).  This paper does not attempt a theological 
interpretation of the Pope Francis’ viewpoints. Rather, the paper considers Laudato Si’ in the context of 
climate policy design and the use of markets therein. 
 24.  POPE FRANCIS, supra note 4, at ¶ 190.  
 25.  Id. at ¶ 195. 
 26.  E.g., id. at ¶¶ 106–14. 
 27.  See id. at ¶ 51. 
 28.  Id. at ¶¶ 48–59. 
 29.  Id. at ¶ 171. 
 30.  Id. at ¶ 171. 
 31.  Robert Stavins, The Papal Encyclical and Climate Change Policy, ECON. VIEW ENV’T, (Oct. 5, 
2015), http://www.robertstavinsblog.org/2015/10/05/the-papal-encyclical-and-climate-change-policy/ 
[https://perma.cc/KAE8-HNUN]. 
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application of such markets.32 The ambiguity rests in part on the pope’s use of the 
term “carbon credits,” which could refer to credits in uncapped offset markets, 
or to allowances in markets governed by a mandatory emissions cap, or to both.33 
Environmental economists and policy experts could agree that the generation 
and sale of credits in an uncapped system (such as voluntary offsets) are of lesser 
reliability in reducing actual emissions, but still favor cap-and-trade allowances 
under a mandatory cap with monitoring and compliance (such as the U.S. acid 
rain trading market) as far more effective.34 The environmental outcomes, 
market oversight, number of market participants, and economic efficiency may 
vary significantly between voluntary uncapped offset credit markets and capped 
allowance trading markets. Furthermore, there is some evidence that the 
Vatican’s own experience with a failed investment in a voluntary carbon offsets 
project in Hungary may have colored the pope’s views on carbon markets 
generally.35 
Thus, a careful reading of the encyclical suggests a more nuanced 
understanding of the “carbon credits” language—and a shared understanding 
that actually favors well-designed market-based climate policies (such as cap and 
trade, rather than uncapped offset credits). The encyclical repeatedly invites a 
dialogue regarding the environment, the economy, and public policy.36 Other 
provisions of the pope’s encyclical criticize a system that allows “business [to] 
profit by calculating and paying only a fraction of the [ecological and social] costs 
involved” in the production process.37 An efficient carbon market or tax, 
however, would require businesses to pay the full social and environmental costs 
of their emissions, not just a fraction. 
  
 
 32.  Compare Anabela Carvalho, Commentary, The Pope’s Encyclical as a Call for Democratic 
Social Change, 5 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 905 (2015) (arguing that the encyclical calls for “rejecting 
futile market ‘fixes’, such as carbon trading”) with Ottmar Edenhofer et al., Commentary, Science and 
Religion in Dialogue Over the Global Commons, 5 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 907 (2015) (“[T]he 
Pope’s concerns might rather be considered as an invitation to discuss [policy alternatives] in light of 
deeper ethical concerns.”). 
 33.  William D. Nordhaus, The Pope & the Market, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Oct. 8, 2015, 
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2015/10/08/pope-and-market/ [https://perma.cc/LHC6-RSAT] (“The 
term ‘carbon credits’ is not a term of art in environmental policy.”). 
 34.  E.g., RICHARD B. STEWART & JONATHAN B. WIENER, RECONSTRUCTING CLIMATE POLICY 
(Am. Enterprise Inst. for Pub. Pol’y Res., 2003) (criticizing uncapped offset credits but favoring capped 
allowance markets). 
 35.  Kenneth R. Richards, Of Markets and Morals, Encyclicals and Environment, Poverty and the 
Pope, THE HILL: CONGRESS BLOG (July 1, 2015, 12:00 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-
blog/energy-environment/246312-of-markets-and-morals-encyclicals-and-environment 
[https://www.http://perma.cc/W2BS -XKC5].  
 36.  POPE FRANCIS, supra note 4, at ¶ 16. See also id. at ¶ 14 (calling for a “new dialogue about how 
we are shaping the future of our planet”), ¶135 (“A broad, responsible scientific and social debate needs 
to take place, one capable of considering all the available information and of calling things by their name. 
It sometimes happens that complete information is not put on the table; a selection is made on the basis 
of particular interests, be they politico-economic or ideological. This makes it difficult to reach a balanced 
and prudent judgement on different questions, one which takes into account all the pertinent variables.”). 
 37.  Id. at ¶ 195. 
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According to Pope Francis, an ethical market will not exist until “the 
economic and social costs of using up shared environmental resources are 
recognized with transparency and fully borne by those who incur them.”38 This 
language argues for internalizing the full social and environmental costs of GHG 
emissions—which is precisely the objective and method of carbon markets. Well-
designed market-based climate policies could both avoid the inefficacies of 
“carbon credits,” as highlighted by Pope Francis, and achieve the shared goal of 
fully internalizing environmental costs. 
More generally, when the encyclical criticizes reliance on markets, it is crucial 
to distinguish unfettered “free” markets from market-based environmental 
policies which are “reconstituted” efficient markets.39 The pope’s criticism is of 
unfettered markets, the very kinds of markets that generate environmental 
harms.40 By contrast, market-based environmental policies, such as taxes and cap-
and-trade, are not unfettered markets—rather, they are the measures needed to 
correct unfettered markets. “While critics of incentives may feel the environment 
is too important to leave to markets, the better view is that environmental 
protection is too important to leave out of markets.”41 The move to incorporate 
environmental values into markets through market-based policy instruments is 
part of a long process of reshaping markets to internalize social values that had 
been previously omitted.42 Therefore, the pope’s criticism of markets in general 
could be seen as an endorsement of market-corrective policies. Viewed in this 
light, his criticism of carbon credits in particular may be seen as an invitation to 
design more effective capped allowance trading markets rather than abandoning 
markets all together. 
  
 
 38.  Id. at ¶ 195 (quoting POPE BENEDICT XVI, CARITAS IN VERITATE (2009)). See also id. at ¶ 167 
(citing Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, June 16, 1972, U.N. 
Doc. A/Conf.48/14/Rev. 1 (1973) [hereinafter 1972 Stockholm Declaration] (stating that the 1972 
Stockholm Declaration established “the obligation of those who cause pollution to assume its costs.”)). 
 39.  See generally Richard B. Stewart, Madison’s Nightmare, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 335, 352 (1990) 
(describing how “reconstitutive law” can internalize externalities toward efficient markets); Jonathan B. 
Wiener, Global Environmental Regulation, 108 YALE L.J. 677, 719 n.166 (1999) (distinguishing 
reconstituted-market incentives both from unfettered inefficient markets and from centralized command 
regulations). 
 40.  See, e.g., POPE FRANCIS, supra note 4, at ¶ 190 (arguing against “a magical conception of the 
market” where “profits alone count” without regard for anything else, like the environment or the poor). 
 41.  Wiener, supra note 39, at 724. 
 42.  See generally DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC 
PERFORMANCE (James Alt ed., 1990) (examining how institutions evolve in response to changing social 
values).  
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IV 
FURTHER EXAMINATION OF THE MORAL ARGUMENTS RAISED BY MARKET-
BASED GHG POLICY 
Despite the differing interpretations regarding the pope’s intent, and the 
potential compatibility of cap-and-trade markets with his remarks, the language 
of the encyclical still invokes elements of three morality-based critiques of 
emissions markets, analyzed further here. The first is an argument that market-
based environmental policies are intrinsically immoral. This argument is 
premised on the view that by pricing emissions (whether they are tax payments 
or allowance transactions), policymakers are endorsing some non-zero level of 
emissions and thereby undermining emitters’ responsibilities to the environment 
and eroding the societal norm that pollution and polluters are inherently bad. 
The second and third criticisms focus on the implementation of emissions 
markets. The second finds immoral the distributional impacts that may arise if 
emitters do not all face the same emission limits, thereby burdening some 
communities with a higher share of the local environmental and public health 
harms. The third finds emissions markets immoral on the view that they will be 
ineffective at addressing climate change or will result in unjust enrichment.43 
A. Argument 1: The Policy Instrument Is Intrinsically Immoral 
For some, opposition to emissions trading is rooted in the view that allowing 
entities to buy and sell emissions credits is equivalent to licensing the “right to 
pollute.”44 Under this view, the market for units of emissions is objectionable on 
three grounds.45 First, emissions markets establish allowances or credits equal to 
a unit of pollution—typically the equivalent of a ton of carbon dioxide in the 
carbon market context. This view argues that the act of creating a tradable good 
out of an environmental harm—commodifying the environment and 
undermining the norm of pollution as intrinsically wrong—is itself immoral. 
A second line of argument suggests that emissions markets conflict with a 
shared duty not to cause environmental harm.46 Rather than imposing mandatory 
emission reduction requirements at each source, emissions markets explicitly 
 
 43.  This taxonomy is similar to the one put forth by Caney and Hepburn, supra note 13, in separating 
purely philosophical arguments about whether markets are inherently immoral from whether they lead 
to poor outcomes when implemented in real world settings.  
 44.  See, e.g., Todd Gitlin, Buying the Right to Pollute? What’s Next?, N.Y. TIMES (July 28, 1989), 
http://www.nytimes.com/1989/07/28/opinion/buying-the-right-to-pollute-what-s-next.html [https://perma 
.cc/S4CH-N5BE] (using a satirical slippery-slope argument to say that a pollution rights market will lead 
to markets in “felony rights” and “torture rights,” among others). 
 45.  Some may also object to markets in general as immoral, and thereby consider carbon markets 
immoral by extension.  
 46.  See, e.g., Kirk W. Junker, Ethical Emissions Trading and the Law, 13 U. BALT. J. ENVTL. L. 149, 
161 (2006) (“Emissions trading is inconsistent with rights to a clean environment (specifically, clean air) 
and the appurtenant duties not to pollute because the necessary underlying theories of contract, tort and 
property that would be needed to enable emissions trading must begin with an assumption that the 
traders own something of value, measured by nothing more than their measurable compliance with a pre-
existing duty established by law.”). 
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embrace compliance flexibility.47 At the end of a compliance period, entities 
subject to the emissions cap must submit the number of allowances equal to the 
corresponding units of pollution emitted. Emissions from an individual facility 
may increase, decrease, or remain unchanged, provided that: (1) each individual 
entity submits enough allowances to cover its actual emissions (or pay a heavy 
penalty); and (2) the cumulative emissions from all covered entities do not exceed 
the cap for that compliance period.48 Because some emitters may avoid reducing 
the environmental harm caused by their facilities by purchasing allowances or 
credits—that is, extra reductions in emissions—from other emitters who 
therefore emit less, detractors of carbon markets view this compliance flexibility 
as allowing some polluters to avoid responsibility for reducing their contribution 
to harming public health or the environmental commons.49 If there is a universal 
duty to avoid environmental harm, the critics say, allowing some facilities to 
evade this responsibility by purchasing emission credits is wrong.50 
A third argument underlying the “inherent immorality” viewpoint rests on 
the view that national and international laws and treaties call for a clean and safe 
environment for all people.51 On this view, even if those laws have not achieved 
uniform protections, together they create a societal norm that pollution is bad 
and those responsible for emitting the pollution have a responsibility to reduce 
their impacts. According to Sandel, for example, the permits-and-fines-based 
environmental policy embedded in environmental statutes in the 1970s carried a 
“moral message” that polluting the environmental commons was wrong. These 
fines required companies to pay penalties for violating their legal and moral 
obligations. In contrast, some argue, using public policy to establish a market for 
emission credits undermines the societal norm of shared sacrifice to protect the 
environment, replacing it with the view “that nature is a dumping ground for 
those who can afford it.”52 Sandel argues that this line of reasoning distinguishes 
carbon taxes from carbon trading—that taxing environmental harm conveys the 
 
 47.  See Daniel A. Farber, Pollution Markets and Social Equity: Analyzing the Fairness of Cap and 
Trade, 39 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 5 (2012) (“[L]et polluters trade permits among themselves so that the 
emission reductions will come from the sources that can most cost-effectively reduce their emissions.”). 
 48.  E.g., How Cap and Trade Works, ENVTL. DEF. FUND, https://www.edf.org/climate/how-cap-
and-trade-works [https://perma.cc/6SL5-AFJN].  
 49.  Alice Kaswan, Justice in a Warming World, ENVTL. F., July/Aug. 2009, at 48, 51–52. See also 
MICHAEL J. SANDEL, WHAT MONEY CAN’T BUY: THE MORAL LIMITS OF MARKETS 75 (2012) (“The 
moral problem with a global market in pollution permits is . . . the outsourcing of an obligation.”). 
 50.  SANDEL, supra note 49. 
 51.  See, e.g., 1972 Stockholm Declaration, supra at 38, Principle 1 (“[Humans have a] fundamental 
right to freedom, equality and adequate conditions of life, in an environment of a quality that permits a 
life of dignity and well-being. . . .”); Clean Power Plan, supra at 1, 64663–64 (“Under the authority of 
Clean Air Act (CAA) section 111(d), the EPA is establishing CO2 emission guidelines . . . . The purpose 
of [these guidelines are] to protect human health and the environment by reducing CO2 emissions from 
fossil fuel-fired power plants in the U.S.”); see also Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the 
Ozone Layer, Sept. 16, 1987, 1522 U.N.T.S. 3. For a discussion of universal environmental rights, see 
Victor B. Flatt, This Land Is Your Land (Our Right to the Environment), 107 W. VA. L. REV. 1 (2004). 
 52.  SANDEL, supra note 49, at 76–77. See also MARK SAGOFF, THE ECONOMY OF THE EARTH: 
PHILOSOPHY, LAW, AND THE ENVIRONMENT (2d ed. 2008). 
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moral stigma, while allowing emissions trading legitimizes the environmental 
harm provided the polluter is willing and able to purchase the permission to cause 
the harm.53 
While Pope Francis does not invoke the “licensing the right to pollute” 
language, the encyclical’s criticism of free market ideologies, of carbon credits, 
and of prioritizing profit maximization over personal responsibility, all suggest 
sympathy for the arguments that carbon markets are inherently immoral. 
These arguments, however, are unpersuasive on several grounds. First, all 
environmental policies license some amount of pollution, except those rare cases 
that require a total ban. Alternatives to market-based instruments, such as 
traditional regulation via prescriptive technology standards or performance 
standards, also license residual pollution—indeed, for free—whereas market-
based instruments force the polluter to pay for each residual unit of emissions 
through an allowance obligation. This is true even if traditional policies are 
backed by heavy penalties for noncompliance, because even a firm in full 
compliance (for example, achieved by installing a scrubber), is permitted to 
continue to release residual (unabated) emissions (despite full compliance) at no 
penalty. On the other hand, under market-based policies, even firms in full 
compliance still must pay the allowance obligation (or tax, if applicable) on their 
residual emissions, or forego the proceeds they could have earned by selling their 
remaining allowances.54 Thus, traditional regulation may represent granting the 
right to pollute even more than market-based policies. Market-based policies can 
force the polluter-pays principle to apply to every unit of emissions, whereas 
traditional regulation exempts residual emissions for free. Imposing a penalty 
only on emissions above some permitted amount expresses the message that the 
permitted amount is legitimate, whereas an emissions tax or cap-and-trade 
expresses the message that the polluter must pay for every unit of emissions.55 
Second, if what is immoral is licensing pollution, or, licensing increased 
environmental harm, then a rejection of market-based approaches may itself be 
an immoral choice. This is particularly true where market-based instruments are 
more likely to address an environmental harm in a cost-effective manner, 
generate more pollution-control for a given expenditure, stimulate greater 
dynamic innovation in new methods of pollution reduction, or enable society to 
buy more environmental protection.56 In such cases, the act of opposing market-
based instruments may actually license greater pollution, which would 
 
 53.  SANDEL, supra note 49, at 76–77. Yet the polluter paying the tax is also paying for permission 
to emit—as is the polluter paying the fine.  
 54.  The obligation to pay for all emissions is true in principle and in practice when all allowances 
must be purchased (for example, at auction). But in many cases allowances are given for free and thus 
only impose opportunity costs on emitters. Allowance allocation is one method of addressing undesirable 
distributional outcomes in a cap-and-trade system.  
 55.  Even if emitters receive free allowances, they must consider the opportunity cost associated with 
(not) selling the allowance or using it for compliance.  
 56.  Including also by attracting more acceptance from skeptics who are actually fearful of the high 
cost of policy solutions. See Campbell & Kay, supra note 11. 
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presumably be an immoral position (according to the critics).57 Third, this point 
is even stronger if morality includes concern for non-human life and the 
environment. Other life on earth suffers from climate change impacts and 
benefits from improving environmental quality and preventing damaging climate 
change—but presumably does not care about humans’ moral scruples and norms 
about how humans prevent climate change. If market mechanisms offer an 
opportunity to achieve greater environmental benefits and successfully prevent 
climate change damages, then opposing market mechanisms in order to vindicate 
asserted human ethical scruples means thereby sacrificing some climate 
protection for the rest of life on earth, and is therefore at odds with a moral stance 
that includes concern for non-human life and the environment. 
B. Argument 2: The Policy Instrument Leads To Immoral Distributional 
Results 
Emissions markets are considered attractive policy strategies precisely 
because of their ability to achieve the goals of lower aggregate emissions and 
lower overall compliance costs while allowing individual operators to decide 
whether to reduce emissions or purchase additional allowances.58 It is often this 
flexibility that stakeholders focusing on impacts on local communities or 
individuals find objectionable.59 
Under an emissions market cap, cumulative GHG emissions from the 
covered sectors will fall to meet the cap, but emissions from individual facilities 
may decrease, increase, or remain unchanged. From a GHG standpoint, this 
shifting of emissions is acceptable because emissions are globally mixed, having 
 
 57.  See Wiener, supra note 39, at 723–26, 779–80 (arguing that opposing more cost-effective market-
based incentives actually licenses greater pollution, so that the critique of immorally licensing pollution 
should favor market-based incentives); see also Carol M. Rose, Scientific Innovation and Environmental 
Protection: Some Ethical Considerations, 32 ENVTL. L. 755, 755–56 (2002) (arguing that “market-based 
environmental regulation[s] . . . may have ethical value that can offset ethical qualms, because they can 
motivate economic actors [who invest mainly for privately appropriable returns] to channel research 
toward the environment, and thus help to narrow the research gap as between ‘propertized’ goods and 
environmental goods.”). 
 58.  Benjamin K. Sovacool, The Policy Challenges of Tradable Credits: A Critical Review of Eight 
Markets, 39 ENERGY POL’Y 575 (2011). 
 59.  See, e.g., Farber, supra note 47, at 29 (“A major concern of environmental justice advocates is 
that emissions allowances might disproportionately end up in the hands of dirtier plants, which may 
themselves be disproportionately located in disadvantaged communities.”); Sheila Foster, Environmental 
Justice in an Era of Devolved Collaboration, 26 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 459, 468 (2002) (“Although 
considering net benefits or risks in isolation of their distribution may satisfy the standard of efficiency, 
consideration of costs and benefits without considering their distribution surely violates most notions of 
equity and justice. Environmental justice advocates have bemoaned the failure of utilitarian-based 
comparative risk analysis—specifically its focus on measuring aggregate environmental and health 
losses—to consider the distributional effects of environmental and health risks on subpopulations that 
may be disproportionately impacted by various environmental hazards.”) (citations omitted); Alice 
Kaswan, Decentralizing Cap-and-Trade? State Controls Within A Federal Greenhouse Gas Cap-and-
Trade Program, 28 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 343, 351–52 (2010); Richard Toshiyuki Drury et al., Pollution Trading 
and Environmental Injustice: Los Angeles’ Failed Experiment in Air Quality Policy, 9 DUKE ENVTL. L. 
& POL. F. 231 (1999). 
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the same overall impact on the climate no matter where they are released and 
essentially no localized effects.60 However, steps to reduce GHG emissions also 
typically reduce releases of more localized co-pollutants, such as particulate 
matter, sulfur dioxide, mercury, and water pollution.61 Thus, the locational 
flexibility allowed by GHG emissions trading may create co-benefits at some 
locales, but co-pollutant increases (or other environmental impacts, such as on 
land use) at other locales. Put another way, the effort to correct negative 
externalities from GHG emissions may generate additional negative externalities 
for parties in some locales affected by co-pollutants or other impacts.62 
This second argument contends that prioritizing cost-effectiveness and 
reductions in aggregate pollution levels without protections to prevent 
concentrations of pollutants with local or regional public health risks would 
facilitate an immoral distributional impact of market-based environmental 
policy. The pope emphasizes this kind of argument, as the encyclical is rooted in 
a concern that modern markets lead to unjust results for the world’s poor.63 
Distributional impacts of pollution, however, are not unique to emissions 
trading as a regulatory remedy.64 Communities located in close proximity to fossil 
fuel–fired power plants and industrial facilities generally face a higher 
environmental burden, and these communities may predominately include lower 
income and minority populations, with or without GHG emissions trading.65 Nor 
 
 60.  See V. Ramanathan & Y. Feng, Air Pollution, Greenhouse Gases and Climate Change: Global 
and Regional Perspectives, 43 ATMOSPHERIC ENV’T 37 (2009) (explaining how long-lived GHGs such as 
CO2 become uniformly disbursed globally and create a warming “blanket” effect). 
 61.  This may occur because reducing GHG emissions involves reducing the use of GHG-emitting 
fossil fuels (for example, by shifting from coal to gas or nuclear or wind/solar, or increasing energy 
efficiency), so that the co-pollutants emitted by burning those fossil fuels are also reduced—a co-benefit 
of GHG abatement. But reducing GHG emissions can also yield countervailing risks (ancillary harms). 
These reductions with ancillary harms could include, for example: reducing CO2 from coal but increasing 
CH4 from conventional gas or unconventional fracking; or, reducing GHGs but increasing nuclear waste. 
If GHG abatement is achieved, not through reduced fossil fuel use, but through carbon capture and 
storage (CCS), then emissions of co-pollutants could increase if CCS requires more fuel to produce 
electricity.  
 62.  See, e.g., MARKET ADVISORY COMMITTEE TO THE CALIFORNIA AIR RESOURCES BOARD, 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR DESIGNING A GREENHOUSE GAS CAP-AND-TRADE SYSTEM FOR 
CALIFORNIA 13 (2007), http://www.energy.ca.gov/2007publications/ARB-1000-2007-007/ARB-1000-
2007-007.PDF [https://perma.cc/W8YP-6NXS]; see also Jonathan Remy Nash & Richard L. Revesz, 
Markets and Geography: Designing Marketable Permit Schemes to Control Local and Regional Pollutants, 
28 ECOLOGY L.Q. 569, (2001) (explaining how to design a cap-and-trade system that avoids local 
hotspots). 
 63.  POPE FRANCIS, supra note 4, at ¶ 51. 
 64.  See, e.g., Stephen M. Johnson, Economics v. Equity: Do Market-Based Environmental Reforms 
Exacerbate Environmental Injustice?, 56 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 111, 117–18 (1999) (noting that traditional 
air quality regulation “has not adequately addressed distributional inequities” and does not explicitly 
require the government to avoid actions that “disparately impact low-income or minority communities”). 
 65.  See U.S. EPA, EJSCREEN: ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE SCREENING AND MAPPING TOOL, 
https://www.epa.gov/ejscreen [https://perma.cc/HTU5-5ZB2] (providing an online mapping tool allowing 
users to explore pollution levels and demographic data); David Pace, Minorities Suffer the Most from 
Industrial Pollution, NBC NEWS (Dec. 14, 2015), http://www.nbcnews.com/id/10452037/ns/us_news-
environment/t/minorities-suffer-most-industrial-pollution/ [https://perma.cc/B6JV-3CM2] (“Residents 
in neighborhoods with the highest pollution scores also tend to be poorer, less educated and more often 
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are pollution hotspots an automatic outcome for emissions markets: the risk of 
hotspots depends on firms’ compliance choices, the locations of facilities, the 
pattern of abatement under the market-based policy (and its alternative), and the 
pattern of exposure near each facility.66 Further, other policies can protect against 
co-pollutants: the EPA recently updated limits on sulfur dioxide, nitrogen 
dioxide, particular matter, and ozone pursuant to the Clean Air Act’s National 
Ambient Air Quality Standards section.67 The agency also promulgated the 
Mercury and Air Toxics Standards rule in 2011, reducing mercury emissions from 
the electric power sector.68 Emission trading systems, including carbon markets, 
do not allow individual emitters to violate their permitting requirements under 
these other programs, although those requirements do not necessarily eliminate 
the pollutants and may face implementation and updating delays to respond to 
new information regarding public health risks.69 Nonetheless, without careful 
consideration of the characteristics of a pollutant and the underlying regulatory 
goals, unfettered emissions trading might in some unusual cases exacerbate, or at 
least fail to mitigate, air quality problems in some locations.70 
 
unemployed than those elsewhere in the country, AP found.”). 
 66.  Farber, supra note 47, at 56 (citing studies finding that there was not a correlation between the 
Acid Rain Program and increased SO2 concentrations in majority African American or Hispanic 
neighborhoods, although one study did find an increased SO2 concentrations in communities with less 
formal education); Jonathan B. Wiener, Hormesis, Hotspots and Emissions Trading, 23 HUM. & 
EXPERIMENTAL TOXICOLOGY 289 (2004) (examining the circumstances necessary to yield hotspots 
under cap and trade systems, including a weak overall cap, the unlikely case of sources purchasing 
allowances to enable them to emit even more than they would have in the absence of the allowance price, 
a non-linear dose-response function for the pollutant, and a particular pattern of abatement and 
allowance purchases that yields a shift of emissions to source locations associated with downwind 
exposure to vulnerable communities). See also H. RON CHAN, B. ANDREW CHUPP, MAUREEN L. 
CROPPER & NICHOLAS Z. MULLER, THE NET BENEFITS OF THE ACID RAIN PROGRAM: WHAT CAN 
WE LEARN FROM THE GRAND POLICY EXPERIMENT? RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE DISCUSSION 
PAPER RFF DP 15–25 (2015) (finding that the Acid Rain Program SO2 trading system unintentionally 
increased local exposure to a co-pollutant, fine particulate matter, in the eastern United States). 
 67.  National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Ozone; Final Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. 65292 (Dec. 28, 
2015) (codified at 40 CFR 50 & 58); National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Particulate Matter; 
Final Rule, 78 Fed. Reg. 3086 (Jan. 15, 2013) (codified at 40 CFR 50–53 & 58); Secondary National 
Ambient Air Quality Standards for Oxides of Nitrogen and Sulfur; Final Rule, 77 Fed. Reg. 20218 (Apr. 
3, 2012) (codified at 40 CFR 50).  
 68.  Mercury Air Toxics Standards, 77 Fed. Reg. 9304 (Feb. 16, 2012) (codified at 40 CFR 60 & 63).  
 69.  See, e.g., Kaswan, supra note 59, at 356 (discussing the issues with implementing a cap-and-trade 
system); Jonas J. Monast, Maximizing Utility in Electric Utility Regulation, 42 FLA. ST. UNIV. L. REV. 135 
(2016). 
 70.  See, for example, environmental justice advocates’ concerns about the Regional Clean Air 
Incentives Market (RECLAIM) implemented by California’s South Coast Air Quality Management 
District in the 1990s. Nash & Revesz, supra note 62, at 580 (“Environmental justice advocates, in 
particular, worry that marketable permit regimes will exacerbate hot spots.”). Yet analyses of the 
RECLAIM program’s environmental impact have not found a “distinct shift in geographic distribution 
of emissions,” due in part to the fact that the program prevented downwind facilities from trading credits 
with upwind facilities to address the localized health concerns, but advocates still view the program as a 
cautionary tale regarding market-based environmental policy. DALLAS BURTRAW & SARAH JO 
SZAMBELAN, U.S. EMISSIONS TRADING MARKETS FOR SO2 AND NOX 20 (Resources for the Future, 
2009). In another example, critics worried that the EPA’s 2005 Clean Air Mercury Rule might have raised 
hotspot concerns, had the D.C. Circuit not overturned the rule for reasons unrelated to its cap-and-trade 
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Although the concern with GHGs is total atmospheric concentration, not 
local impacts, GHG emissions are indeed often associated with other pollutants.71 
Concerns about the distributional impacts of a carbon market relate not only to 
possible increases in local environmental harm, but also to inequitable 
differences in reductions in local environmental harm. Even if additional air 
quality standards prevent an increase in co-pollutant emissions at facilities 
purchasing GHG allowances, some locations will experience larger reductions 
while others may remain unchanged or experience smaller reductions (a pattern 
that can occur under non-market-based policies as well). Under that scenario, 
some communities could face a higher environmental burden than others, even 
though, in the aggregate, all communities accrue overall environmental benefits 
due to the large reductions in GHG emissions. This suggests the value of 
designing policies to reduce GHGs and co-pollutants in concert, yielding both 
global climate and local health benefits.72 
A related distributional critique of carbon markets focuses on the potential 
mismatch between an economically efficient distribution of policy costs and the 
actual costs borne by affected parties. When either the tax or cap-and-trade 
approach yields the efficient outcome (marginal benefits of abatement equal the 
marginal cost), the underlying assumption is that the bearer of the harm caused 
by the pollutant could be fully compensated (such as through the imposition of 
the tax and subsequent transfer to the aggrieved party), but it does not require 
that such a transfer occur. This subsequent transfer, referred to as a “potential 
Pareto improvement” (PPI), is one of the core tenets of utilitarian welfare 
economics.73 
Even if a PPI outcome is economically efficient, however, it could be 
inequitable if the party bearing the pollution damage or mitigation cost is not the 
party that actually receives compensation or otherwise directly benefits from 
abatement (for example, via a reduction in local co-pollutant levels).74 In the case 
 
design. Mercury emissions from coal-fired power plants were not then covered by other Clean Air Act 
provisions. If the court allowed the rule to remain in effect, the market system included in the rule might 
have allowed some facilities to maintain, or possibly increase, emissions in some locales, while other 
facilities necessarily reduced their emissions to meet the overall 70% reduction cap. Robert N. Stavins, 
A Meaningful U.S. Cap-and-Trade System to Address Climate Change, 32 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 293, 
364 (2008). In most cases, emissions trading markets have not led to such hotspots or unfair distribution. 
See Farber, supra note 47.  
 71.  Kaswan, supra note 59, at 351–52 (“[C]arbon dioxide emissions are almost always accompanied 
by more hazardous co-pollutants. Particulates, sulfur oxides, nitrogen oxides, volatile organic 
compounds, benzene, and mercury are common co-pollutants.”). Still, reductions in GHGs could be 
associated with decreases, or increases, in other pollutants. 
 72.  See Noah Scovronick et al., Reduce Short-Lived Climate Pollutants for Multiple Benefits, 386 
LANCET e28 (2015); Drew Shindell et al., Simultaneously Mitigating Near-Term Climate Change and 
Improving Human Health and Food Security, 335 SCIENCE 183 (2012). 
 73.  The concept was first advanced by the 19th–20th century Italian economist, V Pareto. See 
generally VILFREDO PARETO, COURS D’ÉCONOMIE POLITIQUE PROFESSE A L’UNIVERSITE DE 
LAUSANNE, Vol. I (1896), Vol. II (1897). 
 74.  See, e.g., RICHARD SCHMALENSEE & ROBERT N. STAVINS, LESSONS LEARNED FROM THREE 
DECADES OF EXPERIENCE WITH CAP-AND-TRADE 18 (Harvard Project on Climate Agreements, 2015), 
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of climate change, a carbon tax imposed on GHG emitters, or, alternatively, a 
carbon allowance price emerging from a cap set at the optimal level, would be 
socially efficient in that the social cost of the problem is internalized into 
production and consumption decisions. This does not ensure, however, that the 
proceeds of the price imposed, say, on an American power plant, will find their 
way to the villagers in a low-lying island nation that is being displaced by sea level 
rise as a result of those emissions. 
In principle, policymakers could remedy this problem through a transfer 
scheme that directs tax or allowance proceeds to the aggrieved party, but this is 
politically challenging to say the least. It also involves tradeoffs with other 
potential uses of those proceeds, such as ameliorating the costs incurred by 
disadvantaged households facing higher energy prices that reflect the cost of 
GHG abatement, using revenues to finance the development of low-carbon 
energy technologies or climate adaptation actions, or correcting the distortions 
and inequities of the existing income tax system by swapping carbon taxes for 
other taxes. 
The potential mismatch between those afflicted by an environmental problem 
and those who would benefit from, or bear the cost of, policy interventions is not 
unique to emissions markets, however. Other policy instruments, such as 
prescriptive technology standards, performance standards, or information 
disclosure policies, are designed to lower emissions but do not generally provide 
any flow of compensation to those harmed by emissions. Emissions markets and 
tax policies do present at least an opportunity to match the harms and proceeds, 
an opportunity that may not exist under these other policy instruments. For 
example, policymakers may direct some of the proceeds of the allowance auction 
or tax directly to the relevant people or countries or to fund certain activities 
aimed at addressing the harms.75 Policymakers could also opt to match costs and 
attract participation by allocating some allowances to cost-bearing entities or 
activities.76 
 
 
 
http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/dp80_schmalensee-stavins.pdf_ [https://perma.cc/5WUP-PTY7] 
(“Applications of cap-and-trade systems have been based either on the reality of uniformly-mixed 
pollutants (AB-32, EU ETS, RGGI) or the assumption of uniform mixing (lead phasedown, SO2 
allowance trading). In theory, with a non-uniformly mixed pollutant, a cap-and-trade system could lead 
to localized hot spots with relatively high levels of ambient concentrations raising distributional issues 
and potentially also efficiency issues.”). But cf. Wiener, supra note 66 (detailing the limited conditions 
under which hotspots may arise and warrant a remedy).  
 75.  For example, the parties to the UNFCCC established a Green Climate Fund to finance 
mitigation and adaption to climate change via transfers from developed to developing countries. REPORT 
OF THE CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES ON ITS SIXTEENTH SESSION, HELD IN CANCUN FROM 29 
NOVEMBER TO 10 DECEMBER 2010, Art. 102, http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2010/cop16/eng/ 
07a01.pdf#page=17 [https://perma.cc/JYC7-RFHP]. 
 76.  See Wiener, supra note 39, at 747–50 (discussing using allowance allocations to engage 
participation in the market). 
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C. Argument 3: The Policy Instrument Is Ineffective And Leads To Unjust 
Enrichment 
The pope’s reference to “speculation” that will “not help reduce emission[s],” 
and the buying and selling of “carbon credits” as a “ploy” to “maintain . . . 
excessive consumption,” frame the criticism of emissions markets as mechanisms 
that may fail to achieve desired environmental goals due to lax emission caps or 
improper market design and may enrich the winners of market manipulation at 
the expense of the poor without improving environmental outcomes.77 If there is 
a moral obligation to mitigate climate change, and to help the poor, then, by 
extension, there is a moral obligation to choose effective strategies to achieve 
both goals. Critics fear that market mechanisms may offer an escape from such 
obligations that shifts burdens from the rich to the poor. 
Some early efforts to implement carbon markets may have fueled these 
concerns. The first phase of the EU ETS suffered from over-allocation of 
allowances due to a lack of reliable data when policymakers set the emissions 
cap.78 If emission allowances turn out to exceed actual emissions, the result is a 
nonbinding cap and low or falling prices. Moreover, allowances issued in Phase I 
were not able to be banked for use in subsequent periods when the cap would be 
tighter. As allowance prices fell toward zero, there was little additional incentive 
for further reductions. But these problems were not necessarily a result of the use 
of a market in allowance trading—if the cap had been set without allowing 
trading, it still would have been set too high—instead, these problems were due 
to a lack of initial data and design of the trading system when setting the cap. 
Data have improved over time, and subsequent phases of the EU ETS have 
included both cap tightening and allowance banking that helped prop up prices 
while emissions have declined. Despite these policy adjustments, the ETS 
allowance prices have remained low, primarily due to three factors: tepid 
economic growth in the European Union reducing emissions, and hence reducing 
demand for allowances compared to the forecasts when the caps were set; the 
success of the allowance market in motivating sources to find low cost abatement 
options; and the role of other complementary policies in reducing emissions, such 
as feed-in tariffs for renewable energy in several EU countries.79 Ex post studies 
 
 77.  POPE FRANCIS, supra note 4, at ¶ 171. See, e.g., MICHELLE CHAN, TEN WAYS TO GAME THE 
CARBON MARKET (Friends of the Earth, 2010) http://www.foe.org/sites/default/files/ 
10WaystoGametheCarbonMarkets_Web.pdf [https://perma.cc/QM37-ZA7K]; FRIENDS OF THE EARTH, 
supra note 4 (discussing concern that market mechanisms may shift burdens to the poor); Kaswan, supra 
note 49, at 51–53 (discussing market features that could invite manipulation). 
 78. A. Denny Ellerman & Barbara K. Buchner, Over-allocation or Abatement? A Preliminary 
Analysis of the EU ETS Based on the 2005–06 Emissions Data, 41 ENVTL. & RESOURCE ECON. 267, 267 
(2008) (“The release of installation-level data for verified emissions and allowance allocations for the 
first 2 years of the trial period for the European Union’s CO2 Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) 
revealed that CO2 emissions were on average about 60 million tonnes or 3% lower than the number of 
allowances distributed to installations for these years.”); Lesley K. McAllister, The Overallocation 
Problem in Cap-and-Trade: Moving Toward Stringency, 34 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 395, 409 (2009). 
 79.  These complementary policies may pose higher abatement costs than the allowance trading 
market. See SCHMALENSEE & STAVINS, supra note 74, at 15–51. 
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of the EU ETS and other cap-and-trade systems generally show that they do 
reduce emissions below projected levels that would have occurred without the 
policy.80 
Another market design that has raised concerns about efficacy is the use of 
offset credits from emissions reductions in uncapped entities to meet compliance 
obligations for capped ones.81 For example, the Kyoto Protocol’s Clean 
Development Mechanism,82 intended to foster investments in emissions 
reduction projects in developing countries, raised a number of these concerns. It 
appeared to enable some project developers to manipulate emission baselines so 
as to receive credits for emission reductions that did not actually occur or were 
not additional to changes that would have occurred anyway.83 As noted above, 
the Vatican’s own experience with voluntary carbon markets demonstrates the 
risk that offset projects may fail to deliver emission reductions without the proper 
protocols and oversight.84 Regulators in jurisdictions that use uncapped offsets to 
meet a mandatory cap, such as in California, and voluntary program authorities, 
such as the Verified Carbon Standard (VCS)85 and the American Carbon 
Registry,86 have tried to address these concerns over time by instituting protocols 
that limit which activities are potentially creditable and require a series of tests 
and data to demonstrate that only reductions that are real, additional, verifiable, 
and permitted get credited. 
Critics also point to concerns that unjust enrichment resulting from carbon 
markets could exacerbate distributional concerns by enabling wealthy sources to 
continue to emit (“maintain excessive consumption”), by buying emission credits 
from poorer countries who must reduce their emissions in order to sell those 
credits.87 But a trading opportunity itself does not compel anyone to sell 
allowances or credits. In a well-functioning market, the choice to sell credits 
 
 80.  See, e.g., Brian C. Murray & Peter T. Maniloff, Why Have Greenhouse Emissions in RGGI States 
Declined? An Econometric Attribution to Economic, Energy Market, and Policy Factors, 51 ENERGY 
ECON. 581, 584–85 (2015) (citing data indicating that the EU ETS decreased emissions by 0.5–8 percent).  
 81.  See Brian C. Murray, Emissions Offsets in a Greenhouse Gas Cap-and-Trade Policy, ISSUES OF 
THE DAY: 100 COMMENTARIES ON CLIMATE, ENERGY, THE ENVIRONMENT, TRANSPORTATION, AND 
PUBLIC HEALTH POLICY 30–31 (Ian W.H. Parry & Felica Day eds., 2010) (discussing common criticisms 
of offsets and possible solutions).  
 82.  Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, art. 12, Dec. 
10, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 22 (1998). 
 83.  Michael Wara, Measuring the Clean Development Mechanism’s Performance and Potential, 55 
UCLA L. REV. 1759, 1763 (2008). 
 84.  Richards, supra note 35. 
 85.  VERIFIED CARBON STANDARD, VCS STANDARD VERSION 3 REQUIREMENTS DOCUMENT 
(2016), http://database.v-c-s.org/sites/vcs.benfredaconsulting.com/files/VCS_Standard_v3.6.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/95FJ-GDGZ] (provides structure and details of the VCS offsets program). 
 86.  AMERICAN CARBON REGISTRY AT WINROCK INTERNATIONAL, THE AMERICAN CARBON 
REGISTRY STANDARD, VERSION 4.0 (2015), http://americancarbonregistry.org/carbon-accounting 
/standards-methodologies/american-carbon-registry-standard/acr-standard-v40-january-2015.pdf [https: 
//perma.cc/L37R-4F39] (provides structure and details of the American Carbon Registry offsets 
program). 
 87.  See POPE FRANCIS, supra note 4, at ¶ 171. 
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would only occur if the seller views the proceeds from the sale as worth more 
than the opportunity to emit. Perhaps the underlying concern is that some people 
are not willing sellers, and are being coerced to refrain from emitting or from 
using resources. If so, coercion is the problem, not the market per se, and the 
remedy is to establish rules against coercion. 
If the same aggregate abatement had to be attained without trading and with 
the same obligations to abate, the wealthy countries would only be spending on 
abatement activities in their own countries and the poor countries would not have 
the opportunity to receive payments for abatement. Creating a well-designed 
allowance trading market thus can open an opportunity for those who have low-
cost abatement opportunities to earn a beneficial new stream of income. This 
income can be used to finance low-carbon development (such as renewable 
energy, cleaner cook stoves, or conservation of forests) and other socially 
beneficial expenditures, while reducing GHG emissions.88 
As another example of the concern about speculation and market 
manipulation, in the EU ETS, in addition to the over-allocation problems in its 
first phase, there were also high profile instances of “windfall profits” whereby 
entities were able to pass along the market price of the allowances to consumers 
even when the entities received the allowances for free. But EU countries were 
able to adjust their allocation methodologies to control for this concern. 
Following the 2008–2009 financial crisis, concerns also arose regarding the 
potential for market manipulation in carbon markets as part of broader concerns 
about financial markets in general.89 
These examples offer cautionary tales regarding the importance of proper 
market design, but do not support a rejection of markets. Carbon markets with 
mandatory emissions caps operate pursuant to the rules imposed by public policy 
(as do other markets). Even if the climate regulations do not include specific 
market design requirements, other generally applicable market regulations may 
still apply to carbon markets,90 and policymakers may choose to implement new 
restrictions to address particular concerns. For example, the California Cap-and-
Trade Program addressed market manipulation concerns by implementing a 
robust tracking system to monitor spot market allowance and offset transactions, 
implementing holding limits preventing a single entity from exercising undue 
market power, and utilizing an independent market monitor to evaluate market 
activity.91 
It is important for any climate policy to be reviewed and adjusted over time 
to reflect evolving realities and pursuit of long-term emission goals. The EU ETS 
 
 88.  See Jill Warren Lucas, Keeping the Trees from Falling in Guyana, DUKENVIRONMENT MAG., 
Spring 2015, at 29 (explaining how programs to pay developing countries to generate carbon credits by 
reducing deforestation can finance a wide range of environmental and social benefits). 
 89.  E.g., Jonas Monast, Climate Change and Financial Markets: Regulating the Trade Side of Cap 
and Trade, 40 ENVTL. L. REP. 10051, 10054 (2010). 
 90.  Id. 
 91.  CAL. EPA AIR RES. BD., CAP AND TRADE: MARKET OVERSIGHT AND ENFORCEMENT (2011), 
http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/market_oversight.pdf [https://perma.cc/W34V-KNK4].  
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has revised its rules over time to address windfall profits, cap stringency, and 
other factors. The northeast U.S. Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative also goes 
through periodic program review, the last of which tightened the emissions cap 
dramatically (by forty percent) and incorporated measures to provide more price 
certainty.92 New jurisdictions are joining existing trading systems (Quebec and 
Ontario with California93) or creating their own (China94) which should allow 
them to benefit from learning about evolving reforms and best practices if 
properly governed. 
V 
HOW MIGHT CARBON MARKETS BE DESIGNED TO RECONCILE THE MORAL 
CONCERNS? 
This part engages in the pope’s call for a “forthright and honest debate” 
regarding environmental challenges and public policy by exploring options to 
address the moral critiques of carbon markets described in part IV.95 Emissions 
markets are explicitly designed to achieve a public policy goal. Policymakers may 
tailor market design and implementation and may coordinate with other policies, 
if necessary, to address potential problems, such as co-pollutants coming from 
the same sources. These alternative or complementary rules generally introduce 
tradeoffs, however, and may share some of the moral challenges or face unique 
problems of their own. This discussion identifies policy measures designed to 
address the moral issues raised above, and highlights key tradeoffs posed by 
designing GHG markets to accommodate these concerns. 
A. Setting Aggressive, Enforceable, All-Inclusive Emissions Caps 
If one concern is that a market-based approach does not reduce emissions 
rapidly or effectively enough, and thereby fails to fulfill what critics see as a moral 
imperative to address climate change, a solution is to set a more stringent 
emissions cap, one so stringent that it achieves more ambitious climate protection 
goals, and even obliges virtually all parties to take substantial action to reduce 
emissions. There are important differences between policies that aim to stabilize 
emissions at modest levels in the near term and those that aspire to very steep 
long-term reductions.96 The former could lead to a subset of emitters with low 
 
 92.  Murray & Maniloff, supra note 80 (describes revisions to the RGGI program in response to 
program review). 
 93.  In April, 2015, Ontario Premier Kathleen Wynne announced Ontario’s intention to join the cap-
and-trade program established by California and subsequently joined by Quebec. Allison Martell & Mike 
De Souza, Ontario confirms it will join Quebec, California in carbon market, GLOBAL ENERGY NEWS 
(Apr. 13, 2015), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-climatechange-canada-idUSKBN0N41X220150413 
[https://perma.cc/CJ5L-3WBH]. 
 94.  See John Fialka, China Will Start the World’s Largest Carbon Trading Market, SCI. AM. (May 
16, 2016), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/china-will-start-the-world-s-largest-carbontrading-
market/ [https://perma.cc/JHL3-DESB]. 
 95.  POPE FRANCIS, supra note 4, at ¶ 16. 
 96.  INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE (IPCC), CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: 
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abatement costs undertaking most of the actual reductions, though the other 
emitters are not getting off free; other emitters still pay for their emission-
reduction obligations (by paying taxes or forgoing allowance sale revenues), just 
at less cost than if they had to reduce emissions on their own (and allowance 
sellers are earning revenues). Under a far steeper, more comprehensive, and 
faster cap, it is unlikely that any emitter would be able to buy all of its required 
emissions reductions from others, as the demand (and therefore price) will be too 
high. Steeper emissions reductions across the board could also increase the 
likelihood of co-pollutant net reductions at most locales—although the steeper 
ambition might also induce increases in countervailing risks from the expansion 
of low or zero emitting energy, such as natural gas (methane emissions, water 
pollution, seismic risks), nuclear power (accidents, wastes), or utility scale 
renewables (land use, habitat), as well as sharper economic dislocations for local 
communities of shuttered facilities. 
B. Implementing Policies To Directly Address Co-Pollutant Concerns 
Ideally, all of the pollutants generated at a facility that also emits GHGs 
would be well-regulated to protect local populations, with or without the GHG 
reduction policies. The addition of GHG reduction policies would not undo these 
other pollutant policies. In the United States, the Clean Air Act requires the EPA 
to revisit national ambient air quality standards on a regular basis to ensure that 
the standards protect public health and welfare based on currently available 
scientific data and technological options for reducing emissions.97 Other 
provisions of the Clean Air Act, such as for toxic air pollutants, also call for 
periodic review.98 Where local pollution concerns persist, these Clean Air Act 
provisions provide an opportunity to impose tighter regulations that operate 
alongside a carbon market. 
GHG emissions trading would not exempt covered facilities from meeting 
other applicable regulatory requirements. Implementing a suite of emission 
restrictions, therefore, would address at least some of the co-pollutant impacts 
associated with GHG emissions, and, in effect, the co-pollutant policies would 
limit locational flexibility of GHG emissions trading. Because co-pollutant 
concerns would be more serious in countries lacking a suite of emissions 
restrictions addressing co-pollutants, such countries could be encouraged and 
assisted to adopt and implement such policies. 
Where regulatory systems do not respond adequately, the potential for local 
hotspots of other pollutants and exposure of vulnerable households may still 
exist. Where there are remaining concerns regarding co-pollutant emissions, the 
most effective solution would be to reform laws and regulations as needed to 
ensure adequate local protections, rather than to prohibit GHG emissions 
trading. Meanwhile, a potential transition policy is to incorporate limits on co-
 
MITIGATION OF CLIMATE CHANGE, § 13.3.3.3 (2007). 
 97.  Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7409 (2012). 
 98.  Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7412 (2012). 
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pollutants into GHG trading for certain local facilities by using real-time data on 
co-pollutant concentrations in electronic allowance trading platforms.99 If 
policymakers identify facilities presenting particular concerns regarding co-
pollutant increases associated with carbon trading,100 they could limit the ability 
of those facilities to meet their compliance obligations via purchased allowances. 
Still, some questions remain. The moral argument may also be on the 
opposite foot: if measures to restrict local co-pollutants would also reduce the 
ambition and efficacy of the GHG emissions reduction policy, then there could 
be a moral argument that stringent control of local co-pollutants is increasing the 
risk of climate damage to other distant, possibly poorer populations. Would there 
be a moral objection to facilities with highly localized co-pollutant problems 
reducing their GHG emissions beyond their GHG compliance obligations (and 
thereby reducing the co-pollutants too, or increasing countervailing risks) in 
order to generate surplus GHG allowances for sale? 
C. Requiring Minimum Reductions From All Emitters 
Another option to ensure shared burden is to require that emitters produce a 
minimum share of their respective required GHG reductions onsite, and then 
allow them to purchase emission reductions from other parties beyond that. This 
approach is consistent with the encyclical’s theme of personal responsibility and 
invokes the concept of “supplementarity” in Article 17 of the Kyoto Protocol.101 
In the United States, emissions trading programs under the Clean Air Act 
operate in parallel with permitting requirements for individual emitters. Sources 
with compliance obligations under the Acid Rain Trading Program102 or the 
Cross State Air Pollution Rule103 may trade allowances, but they must also 
comply with any emission limits included in their respective operating permits.104 
Requiring emission reductions at a particular source or within a particular 
sector may achieve public health goals, but could also undermine the efficiency 
benefits of a carbon market. This, in turn, could inhibit its ambition as its costs 
rise. Market restrictions, such as minimum abatement shares, may also prevent 
high-cost emitters from spending to reduce emissions at low-cost facilities, which 
may mean that wealthy countries are restricted from financing emissions 
abatement in lower-income countries. Such market restrictions could also lead to 
local economic dislocations near sources by causing units to retire that otherwise 
 
 99.  See generally Nash & Revesz, supra at 62 (discussing how to design a cap-and-trade market to 
limit local concentrations).  
 100.  For example, if an emitting power plant is expected to significantly increase utilization as other 
facilities in the area retire. 
 101.  Kyoto Protocol, supra note 82, at art. 17. 
 102.  42 U.S.C. § 7651(a)–(o) (2012). 
 103.  Federal Implementation Plans: Interstate Transport of Fine Particulate Matter and Ozone and 
Correction of SIP Approvals, 76 Fed. Reg. 48,207, 48,208 (Aug. 8, 2011) (codified at 40 C.F.R. § 51).  
 104.  Although these permits generally identify maximum levels of pollution rather than requiring 
minimum reductions at a source, the example demonstrates precedent for trading programs operating in 
parallel with other emission limits applied to the same sources. 
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could have purchased allowances to remain in operation. Both impacts may be at 
odds with distributional equity. Determining the moral acceptability of each 
option, therefore, may depend on a careful assessment of the nature of the co-
pollutant concerns and the multiple impacts of the market restrictions.105 
D. Compensating Harmed Parties And Disadvantaged Final Consumers 
Pricing carbon in a market can perpetuate or create equity problems if 
populations affected by climate change are still not compensated, and if carbon 
prices impose cost burdens on workers and consumers of GHG-emitting goods, 
like energy or food, with disproportionate impacts on poor people. A potential 
solution is to develop a system of monetary transfers to compensate those parties 
in some agreed upon proportion. For instance, the government could charge a 
GHG tax or auction allowances, and transfer some or all the revenues to the 
directly harmed parties and those affected by higher energy prices or lost jobs. It 
is likely to be impossible to parse out the payments to the billions of Earth’s 
inhabitants who will be affected by climate change. Hence this transfer might 
work as part of an international allowance trading market with headroom 
allowances initially allocated to countries suffering harm.106 Alternatively, it 
could be part of an international mechanism to compensate parties ex post for 
climate “loss and damage” as envisioned by advocates that such provisions 
should be part of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change.107 Should 
these payments go to all negatively affected parties (possibly everyone on the 
planet), or only to poor countries bearing the brunt of climate change impacts? 
If the latter, what about rich people in poor countries and poor people in rich 
countries? Similar issues arise for the recipients of transfers for higher energy 
prices, but those may be a bit easier to apportion to parties deemed vulnerable 
to such price increases because they are tied directly to energy purchase 
transactions. 
E. Further Thoughts On Design Tradeoffs 
These market designs attempt to address the moral misgivings some parties 
have about the use of markets to address climate change mitigation. Carbon 
markets operating pursuant to a mandatory emissions cap exist due to policy 
choices, and policymakers designing and overseeing those markets have 
numerous options regarding market design. Tradeoffs are inevitable, however. 
These tradeoffs may require balancing efficiency and equity goals, as well as 
 
 105.  The encyclical acknowledges the distributional equity concerns. See, e.g., POPE FRANCIS, supra 
note 4, at ¶ 165 (“[T]he international community has still not reached adequate agreements about the 
responsibility for paying the costs of this energy transition.”). 
 106.  STEWART & WIENER, supra note 34; Wiener, supra note 39. 
 107.  See, e.g., ALLIANCE OF SMALL ISLAND STATES, LOSS & DAMAGE (2012), http://aosis.org/loss-
damage/ [https://perma.cc/XTJ7-3FPD] (arguing “for a system capable of compensating victims for the 
associated costs” of the impacts of climate change). The Paris Agreement, article 8, calls for measures to 
address “loss and damage,” but the Decision adopting the Paris Agreement provides in paragraph 52 that 
“Article 8 of the Agreement does not involve or provide a basis for any liability or compensation.”  
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equitably addressing different impacts among diverse disadvantaged parties. And 
such tradeoffs also arise from non-market policy instruments. Restricting climate 
markets may raise costs, reduce incentives for innovation, inhibit the ambition of 
mitigation, and leave the world more vulnerable to climate change. Of course, 
adopting any emissions cap that is not immediately zero would allow some 
damages to be incurred over time, but adopting an absolute immediate 
elimination of GHGs would impose exorbitant costs and risks on all—rich and 
poor. Carbon markets operate in an intermediate zone to reduce emissions cost-
effectively over time. Limiting trading may also raise costs and incur 
distributional burdens on vulnerable households that bear those costs. The 
ultimate impact of market restrictions would depend on a number of factors, 
including the measures used, the stringency of the emissions cap, the total 
number of entities subject to the emissions cap, the number of facilities affected 
by the restrictions, the patterns of abatement and pollutant exposures, the 
pattern of financial flows to support cleaner development, and available 
mitigation measures. It is prudent to assess all of these tradeoffs when 
considering the moral implications of a policy choice. 
Because there will unlikely be sufficient revenue to compensate both all those 
affected by climate change and all those affected by higher energy costs, there 
may be negative effects on some bearing the costs; realistic policies may yield net 
benefits (potential Pareto improvement), but not universal benefit. In addition, 
the revenues generated by a carbon market could have other socially beneficial 
uses. Even a large revenue pool that can be created by a large-scale market is 
finite and will require choices. For instance, auction revenues targeted for 
vulnerable populations could instead be used to reduce other taxes (perhaps 
progressively); to finance public investment in low-carbon research, development 
and deployment that can help accelerate the pace and lower the cost of carbon 
reductions and potentially reduce co-pollutants; or to support adaptation 
measures necessary to respond to the climate change that appears inevitable 
already. One might argue that all of these activities should indeed be funded, and 
moreover that a carbon market is not the only way to do this—regular 
government revenue appropriations can also be used. 
VI 
CONCLUSION 
Climate change will have significant, although not uniform, impacts on 
individual well-being and on human societies as a whole. The pervasive nature of 
GHGs means that effective mitigation measures will require changes in energy 
production, agriculture, and land use. No single technological option will address 
the problem, and reducing emissions will likely be a long and expensive effort 
with an unequal distribution of the costs and benefits of doing so. The scale of 
the challenge raises a number of complex moral and economic questions. 
Moral dimensions of the debate are not limited to the environmental impacts 
of climate change or distributional matters alone. Poverty has direct health 
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effects, and “energy poverty” is a key contributor to global inequity.108 An 
estimated 1.4 billion people lack access to clean, affordable energy.109 A rapid 
transition away from high-emitting sources could dramatically raise the price of 
energy in some areas, as well as pose other risk–risk tradeoffs, including health 
and environmental impacts.110 Emission reduction measures could have 
significant distributional economic impacts for communities whose local 
economies depend heavily on jobs associated with the production and 
consumption of high-emitting fuels. These considerations do not mean that 
reducing GHG emissions is unwise; rather, they mean that GHG reduction 
policies must be carefully designed to address multiple kinds of impacts. 
Assessing the morality of policy options for mitigating climate change, 
therefore, is a complex undertaking that should acknowledge the role of 
underlying value choices. This task requires balancing several considerations, 
including the aggregate harms of climate change and the aggregate benefits and 
costs of GHG emissions mitigation (including the co-benefits and countervailing 
harms of alternative mitigation options); the distribution of harms, benefits, and 
costs associated with climate change, GHG emissions mitigation, co-benefits, and 
countervailing harms; and the moral characteristics of the policy instruments 
used to achieve these aggregate and distributional outcomes. Conclusions 
regarding particular policy instruments may vary depending on the sectors in 
question and the location of the emitters. 
Market-based approaches offer a number of advantages for addressing 
climate change and balancing interests, including cost-effectiveness, 
incorporating social costs of emissions into the price of goods produced (that is, 
the polluter pays), and incentivizing emission-reducing behaviors and 
technologies. Despite the alignment of the globally-mixing nature of GHGs and 
the cost effectiveness of market-based emission reduction strategies, however, 
carbon markets continue to face criticism, including those rooted in moral 
arguments such those articulated by Pope Francis. 
It is undeniable that market-based instruments—and any policy approach—
introduce distributional impacts in terms of who ultimately pays for the 
reductions, who suffers impacts from the actions taken to mitigate emissions, and 
who profits from the actions. Market flexibility also introduces uncertainty 
regarding where and how reductions occur, leading to uncertainty regarding local 
 
 108.  See, e.g., JIM ROGERS & STEPHEN P. WILLIAMS, LIGHTING THE WORLD 31–44 (St. Martin’s 
Press, 2015) (discussing the negative effects of living without stable access to electricity in many parts of 
the world, with particular focus on Africa). 
 109.  Nina Robertson et al., As the World Burns: A Critique of the World Bank Group’s Energy 
Strategy, 43 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,760, 10,762 (2013) (citing INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, WORLD ENERGY 
OUTLOOK 96, 56 (2010)). 
 110.  The UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC) (1992), article 4(1)(f), recognizes 
these tradeoffs and requires parties to “employ appropriate methods, for example impact assessments, 
formulated and determined nationally, with a view to minimizing adverse effects on the economy, on 
public health and on the quality of the environment, of projects or measures undertaken by them to 
mitigate or adapt to climate change.” 
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co-pollutant impacts. These critiques raise important concerns, but they are not 
unique to market-based instruments. Many of these issues also arise from 
traditional source-specific, permit-based regulation as conventionally applied. 
For example, under the Clean Air Act, stationary source permits often vary based 
on the type of source and its location. Emission reductions are not uniform. 
Furthermore, conventional regulation does not require polluters to pay for each 
unit of emissions, and effectively licenses polluting for free beyond the emissions 
level specified in their respective permits. Market-based policy instruments, 
which reduce emissions more effectively at lower cost, and deliver financing to 
low-cost abaters, can thus be superior to conventional non-market policies on 
moral and equity criteria as well as on economic and environmental criteria. 
As with any major policy initiative, it is important to evaluate available 
options and compare the full scope of potential outcomes to the policy goals. 
Market-based mechanisms are not a blanket panacea to the challenges associated 
with climate change, but a wholesale rejection of markets as policy instruments 
risks forgoing numerous benefits offered by carbon pricing and compliance 
flexibility. Furthermore, carbon markets and carbon taxes are functions of public 
policy choices. To the extent that concerns arise regarding these options, 
measures such as tailored market design, oversight, review, and revision, may 
offer preferable strategies that achieve the benefits associated with market-based 
policies while mitigating negative impacts. 
 
